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IS KIERKEGAARD A “VIRTUE ETHICIST”?
Robert C. Roberts
Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good 
source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and 
Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast 
doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethi-
cist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent 
traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and 
moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and salvation entirely 
to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues 
and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character eth-
ics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between 
Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic 
communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue 
ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom 
and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics.
Introduction
In a rich and informative recent book, Kierkegaard and Religion, Sylvia Walsh 
argues that Kierkegaard should not be read as a kind of “virtue ethicist.” 
She is responding to a small band of Kierkegaard interpreters who, in di-
verse ways, see continuities between Kierkegaard and virtue ethics. They 
find support for this reading in his comments about character, upbringing, 
upbuilding, inwardness, becoming a self, consolidating personality, and 
being an individual; and in his detailed expositions of moral and spiritual 
qualities such as courage, bold confidence, simplicity, faith, meekness, 
truth, earnestness, love, patience, humility, forgiveness, honesty, hope, 
gratitude, and mercifulness. Kierkegaard seems to them to be practicing 
a kind of “virtue ethics,” in some ways continuous with ancient Greek 
ethics and its revival in more recent philosophical moral psychology.1 This 
paper is an assessment of Walsh’s assessment of this claim which will, I 
hope, clarify what it is or might be to advocate the language of virtue in 
1Walsh cites work by Gregory Beabout, Andrew Burgess, Randall Colton, John Daven-
port, David Gouwens, David Humbert, Jason Mahn, Robert Roberts, Anthony Rudd, Mark 
Tietjen, and Claudia Welz.
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Christian ethical thought. I will state Walsh’s arguments and respond to 
them. The result should be to clarify both a Christian concept of virtue and 
Kierkegaard’s relationship to “virtue ethics.”
In retrospect of her arguments Walsh concludes,
A close examination of key texts and passages from Kierkegaard’s writings 
does not support an interpretation of him as a virtue ethicist in continui-
ty with the classical and medieval virtue traditions and the contemporary 
revival of virtue ethics. The fact that Kierkegaard does not employ the lan-
guage of virtue in defining character and the spiritual qualities that consti-
tute it also indicates that, in agreement with some empirical studies, he does 
not equate character with  virtue, which in his view is associated with sagac-
ity [worldly cunning], the complacent social morality of Christendom, and 
selfish or “being for oneself” qualities acquired and/or perfected by human 
agency. The  spiritual qualities that distinguish ethical-religious and Chris-
tian character, by contrast, are given by God, appropriated in freedom, and 
possessed unselfishly.2
Nevertheless, Walsh notes that Kierkegaard’s intense concern with char-
acter, personality, inwardness, being an individual, becoming a self, and 
subjectivity suggests that he should be called a character ethicist, and she 
affirms that his writings are saturated with discussions of specific “spir-
itual qualities”—distinct aspects of good character. I will examine her 
reasons for rejecting the label “virtue ethicist” and her understanding of 
the difference between virtue and character.
I now state the theses of this paper about virtues inspired by 
Kierkegaard’s thought. Christian virtues are not the same traits as pagan 
virtues. Christian virtues are not ways of achieving merit or justification 
before God. They are not “perfections” in the absolute sense. They are 
not acquired without divine help. Christian virtues, while benefiting 
their possessor, are not solely for the benefit of their possessor. They are 
not “habits” in the ordinary sense of the word. They are infused with a 
“negative” character that reflects the pervasiveness of sin in human life. 
Christian virtues are products of free choice and striving. They are achiev-
able to some extent and are God’s achievement in us. They are traits of 
character. Though Kierkegaard uses the word “virtue” little—far less than 
he uses “character,” “inwardness,” “the single individual,” and other vir-
tue-like terms—the specific character traits that he explores at length are 
virtues, given the exclusions and qualifications just summarized. That is, 
in the most encompassing definition, virtues are just good traits of char-
acter. And we need a broad, liberal definition of “virtue,” because virtue 
concepts are embedded in views of the world and of God and of human 
nature, and thus can vary as widely in their particular features as such 
philosophies, religions, and worldviews differ from one another. Com-
paring the features of Christian virtues listed in this paragraph, gleaned 
2Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 176.
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from Kierkegaard’s thought, with their counterparts in non-Christian out-
looks illustrates this point.
In the contemporary discussion, “virtue ethics” is a broad term used to 
refer to a variety of quite different constructs that have some reference to 
virtue concepts.3 Particularly pertinent to the study of Kierkegaard is a dif-
ference that Walsh does not clarify when she says that Kierkegaard is not a 
virtue ethicist in the sense of “the contemporary revival of virtue ethics.” 
One strand of contemporary virtue ethics sees it as an ethical theory on 
analogy, and perhaps in competition with, modern ethical theories such as 
Kantian deontology and various consequentialisms.4 Clearly, Kierkegaard 
is not a virtue ethicist in this sense. His goal is not to come up with an 
ethical theory, but to contribute to his readership’s transformation of char-
acter. His strategy in this character-upbuilding project characteristically 
involves focusing on and ruminating about specific qualities of char-
acter—faith, love, patience, humility, gratitude, and all the rest. His focus 
on these distinct but interrelated spiritual qualities, which are tradition-
ally called “virtues,” gives his writing much of the communicating power 
for which it is known. In this way he is much less like the philosophers of 
“the contemporary revival of virtue ethics” than he is like the ancient ethi-
cists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, for whom 
the purpose of philosophy was to make human beings wise, complete, 
mature, and fully human.5
Some References to Virtues in Kierkegaard’s Writings
Walsh correctly observes that after Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, the 
last of which were published in 1844, Kierkegaard does not much use the 
word “virtue” in a directly commendatory way. But she makes him out to 
be speaking critically of virtue where in fact he isn’t. Here is a passage in 
which she apparently misses the irony in his use of “virtue.” She writes,
In [a journal] entry from 1847 [Kierkegaard] likens “patience, faith, humility, 
etc. in short, all the Christian virtues” to “heroism in peacetime” in which 
people play at religion just as they play at war.6
On this reading the Christian virtues are not ethically serious spiritual 
qualities. But if we look at the journal entry itself, we see that the refer-
ences to the virtues are ironic. Kierkegaard writes,
Patience, faith, humility, etc., in short, all the Christian virtues in non-actual 
dangers (for example, when a person shirks making the right decisions, re-
fuses to take the shower bath of actuality so that he is actually scoffed at, 
is actually destitute, is actually hated by the world, etc.) are like heroism 
3See Roberts, “Varieties of Virtue Ethics.”
4Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics; Slote, Morals from Motives; Watson, “The Primacy of Char-
acter.” For critique, see Roberts, Emotions in the Moral Life, chapter 1. 
5See Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?
6Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 98.
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in peacetime. It is as if a soldier on the drill ground in a peaceful military 
exercise to capture a peewit-house assumed a martial air like that of Daniel 
Rantzau in battle. What is comical about it is the martial air—and the dan-
ger is pure nonsense, make-believe, a stage setting. Children play soldier, in 
peacetime men play war, and most men play at religion.7
Kierkegaard is using the expression “Christian virtues,” not for the real 
thing, but for simulacra thereof, or what some people refer to as Christian 
virtues. His point is not that patience, faith, and humility are as bogus 
as a martial air adopted while playing war-games in peacetime, but that 
what people call patience, faith, and humility in Christendom, where ev-
erybody is a sort of Christian and nobody gets persecuted for endorsing 
Christianity, are like heroism in peacetime. Kierkegaard’s criticism of such 
self-deceiving simulacra implies the very opposite: that real Christian vir-
tues fit a person for reality in a way analogous to heroism in time of war.
Note that to use “virtue” ironically in reference to pseudo-excellences 
is to presuppose that in real or non-ironical references to virtue, virtue is a 
genuine excellence. These non-ironical meanings of the word shadow the 
ironic ones and are necessary to their irony. To say ironically that Donald 
Trump is a wise man is not to put down wisdom (that wouldn’t be an iron-
ical reference), but to put down Trump. When Socrates tells Euthyphro, 
ironically, that he wants Euthyphro to be his teacher, he isn’t objecting to 
teachers, but putting Euthyphro in his place as a fake.
Walsh also quotes the Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
if it is a sorry error literally to want to be like God through virtue and ho-
liness instead of becoming more and more humble, then it is all the more 
ludicrous to want to be that in consideration of one’s being an unusually 
brilliant mind, because virtue and purity are indeed essentially related to 
the nature of God, but the second stipulation makes God himself ridiculous 
as the tertium comparationis [third element in a comparison, a standard].8
Here Johannes Climacus is criticizing vain efforts to be like God through 
virtue and holiness, but not rejecting virtue and holiness; indeed, he is, 
after all, commending “becoming more and more humble” (and humility 
is one of the Christian virtues). Then he warns against thinking that you 
can have virtue and purity by having a brilliant mind, because God has 
these attributes and God has a brilliant mind! Positively he would be 
saying that human virtue and holiness falls infinitely short of God’s glory 
(though it is “essentially related to the nature of God”) and that human 
virtue and purity differs categorically from having a brilliant mind. These 
are points that a “virtue ethicist” after a Kierkegaardian or Protestant 
stamp will applaud.
Walsh notes that
7Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, 1:941 (from 1847).
8Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 565, quoted in Walsh, Kierkegaard and 
Religion, 84.
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As Vigilius [Haufniensis] sees it, “all ancient ethics was based on the pre-
supposition that virtue can be realized,” whereas the Christian category of 
sin “lies entirely beyond its reach” as the concept upon which ethics is ship-
wrecked, suggesting that virtue is not attainable.9
Whether we are talking about Christian virtues or the virtues of “ancient 
ethics,” it will be true that the category of sin “lies entirely beyond [their] 
reach” as remedies for sin. But the Christian virtues do take into consider-
ation the category of sin; they presuppose it. For example, faith as belief 
and trust in the atonement of Christ obviously depends on an awareness 
of sin—the need for Christ’s atonement. (More on this in a moment.)
Are faith, love, gratitude, and humility unattainable? Perfect or absolutely 
flawless faith and love and gratitude are unattainable, in Kierkegaard’s 
view. To note this is just to note a general feature of Christian virtues: that 
only Christ perfectly exemplifies them. To assume they are not attainable 
to any extent at all would be to vitiate much of Kierkegaard’s missionary 
work in Christendom. A Christian virtue ethics must allow that perfection 
in the Christian virtues can be only approximated in this life.
Kierkegaard eschews the great and heroic virtues of paganism in the 
following passage of his journal:
One can say that [Christiani]ty absolutely did not come into the world in 
order to develop these great virtues in the individual—on the contrary, the 
great virtues and the heroic were precisely what were prominent in pa-
ganism. But then the situation was in fact that precisely because the ideal 
κατ’εξοχήν [par excellence] was unknown to paganism, the individual was 
given occasion to imagine that he himself could almost become the ideal and 
take pride in it, so the contrast came to be between these heroes and all other 
hum[an] beings, who were more or less idiots. Then the true ideal revealed 
itself. The true ideal reveals that everyone has need of grace, humbling ev-
eryone. Differences built upon selfishness cannot hold—because confront-
ed with the ideal, the strongest needs grace just as much as the weakest. 
And in a certain sublime sense the ideal transforms into a  jest all differences 
between one hum[an] being and another with respect to perfection. Thus 
Christianity did not come in order to develop these heroic virtues in the 
individual, but to remove selfishness and to set forth  love: “Let us love one 
another.” Less time and diligence is used in perfecting oneself up to a certain 
maximum—which can so easily be a sort of selfishness—than in working for 
others.10
Those who had the “great virtues” of paganism often or characteristically 
used them, Kierkegaard thinks, to establish their superiority over their 
neighbors, “who were more or less idiots.” Thus these “virtues” came 
equipped with a vicious selfish invidiousness,11 perhaps based on the idea 
that they were achievements attributable to their possessors’ excellence 
9Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 84, citing Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, 17, 19.
10Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, 1:991 (1851), quoted at Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 
97.
11For confirmation, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 4, chapter 3.
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of choices. But the character ideal was wrong. When Christ, who really 
had the virtues, appeared, the effect among those who understood was to 
humble everyone and to show that any difference of excellence between 
one person and another was a joke (the laughter expresses humility, 
but with the sadness of contrition and compassion). The aim was not to 
be admired as better than one’s neighbor, but to be as much like Christ 
as possible (to love the neighbor), and that was a task for a lifetime.12 
Kierkegaard spent his entire work life in the effort to build up the church, 
to build up individuals, and to build them up in faith, hope, love, patience, 
humility, forgivingness, bold confidence, gratitude, simplicity, and other 
positive personal qualities that follow as imperatives from the gospel of 
grace preached to sinful people who are by nature a synthesis of freedom 
and “necessity.”
Sagacity and Virtue
Walsh argues that, even within the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, where 
he does use “virtue” a few times in a commendatory way, Kierkegaard 
is ambivalent toward virtue, because on the one hand “he commends 
the beautiful virtue of a conciliatory spirit and suggests that it cannot be 
attained by being sagacious” and on the other he “associates virtue neg-
atively with sagacity.”13 Usually Kierkegaard uses “sagacity” (Kloghed) to 
mean something like worldly cunning or devious cleverness. But sometimes 
he uses the word neutrally to mean good at figuring out how to get from a to 
b. He contrasts a dutifully resolute person “who has understood what the 
highest is but is also willing to pay everything to buy it” with a sagacious 
person, who in a worldly manner buys at a high price only after “reck-
oning the conditions”14 that seem to him to make the high price still a good 
bargain. Here is the passage that Walsh regards as evidence that Kierkeg-
aard associates virtue with worldly cunning or devious cleverness:
It is true and always will be true that  virtue is the highest sagacity. It is 
also certain that the sensate person is eager to be sagacious and aspires to 
sagacity, but even if someone, in order to win him, were to expound this, he 
still would never win him to virtue; if that is to happen, the sensate person’s 
conception of sagacity would first have to be completely altered.15
If we take sagacity to be the capacity to discern the way to one’s best 
interest, then true sagacity—we might call it wisdom—for Kierkegaard 
will be something like the ability to discern the way to one’s eternal happiness. 
The sensate person, as sensate, being locked into a misconception of what 
12If we think of heroism as the ability to maintain one’s integrity against the erosions of 
crowd-morality, heroism is clearly a good thing in Kierkegaard’s judgment. I am grateful to 
an anonymous referee for alerting me to this. 
13Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 86.
14Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 379.
15Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 84 citing Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 
380.
331IS KIERKEGAARD A “VIRTUE ETHICIST”?
is in his own best interest, will be impervious to efforts to win him to 
virtue by showing him what makes for his eternal happiness. If he is to be 
won over to virtue, he must change his conception of what is in his own 
best interest—which is to say that he must forsake his sensate view of the 
world. The person who has true sagacity will also understand the ways 
a sensate sagacity still has some hold on her, but will use her knowledge 
of its patterns of reasoning to put herself on guard against them in the 
interest of the telos of the higher sagacity. “Only that sagacity is true that 
helps a person to make every sacrifice in order to will the good in truth.”16 
Despite this last quotation, Walsh seems not to notice that sagacity comes 
in at least two types: true sagacity and sensate sagacity. She seems to as-
sume that “sagacity” must mean devious cleverness, and therefore to say 
that “virtue is the highest sagacity” must be to treat it “negatively.” But 
this is not the most natural reading of the passage.
Increased Awareness of Ethical Deficiency and the Christian Inverse Dialectic
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus presents at length an account of what happens when 
a person seriously undertakes to relate “absolutely to the absolute and 
relatively to all relative ends.” In more ordinary words, this is an effort 
to obey God unconditionally, to take with absolute seriousness the first 
commandment, and to treat no other goals as even in competition with 
one’s devotion to God. Climacus conducts the reader through three suc-
cessively deepening stages of “existential pathos”17: the initial expression is 
the desire to be related to God in perfect devotion; the essential expression 
is the suffering of frustration of this desire; and the decisive expression is 
the guilt in which the person finds himself mired and unable to extricate 
himself. This is the ideal preparation for life in Christ, in which one re-
ceives the God-relationship as a gift, entirely unmerited and as acquired 
independently of one’s own tired agency. Walsh thinks this story separates 
Kierkegaard from all virtue ethics.
Another reason why it is problematic to call Kierkegaard a virtue ethicist 
is suggested by the process of ethical-religious  development in  Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript (1846), where human  striving culminates not in the 
achievement of a virtuous personality but just the opposite, namely in an 
increasing realization of our inability to bring our lives into conformity with 
the good.18
An awareness of your own failings, if veridical, certainly indicates that you 
haven’t arrived at perfect virtue. But the opposite of a virtuous personality 
is not an awareness of your failings, but a vicious personality. Part of a 
16Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 94 cited by Walsh, Kierkegaard and 
Religion, 84.
17Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 387–555.
18Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 91.
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person’s viciousness may be his obliviousness of his vice;19 and the aware-
ness of your failings may be virtuous. Indeed, that’s the way it seems to go 
in Climacus’s account: the moral progress is the ability to recognize how 
far you are from perfection. Contrition is not an Aristotelian virtue, but it 
is a Christian virtue, one that is intimately related to the virtue of faith and 
that expresses Christian wisdom and humility. Here we encounter what 
Kierkegaard calls Christianity’s “inverse dialectic.”
Christianity’s dialectic is inverse in comparison with the dialectic of 
any ethical outlook according to which you make moral progress by a 
direct path like the following: You have a moral goal (say, you want to 
be more generous) and you set out to become more generous by acting 
more generously, by setting your mind on the beauty of generosity, by 
contemplating the potential good you will do by your generosity, and so 
forth. You may have setbacks along the way, but if you soldier on you will 
prevail. If this kind of account is the most basic outline for progress in 
Christianity, then Christianity’s dialectic is just like Aristotle’s, a “direct” 
dialectic. To think this is right, thinks Kierkegaard, is to distort and su-
perficialize Christianity. It is to underrate the difficulty that is signaled 
by the first commandment. When we seek, by a direct route, to obey the 
first commandment, or to follow Jesus’s instructions to the letter, we find 
ourselves spiritually knocked back on our heels. But if we are faithful, we 
don’t give up the fight, even though we become increasingly aware of our 
inability to achieve the goal on our own. We become increasingly grateful 
for God’s grace in Christ and the help of the Holy Spirit in our spiritual 
struggles. (Gratitude is another Christian virtue.)
Walsh thinks the inverse dialectic of Christianity in Kierkegaard’s 
thought is a reason for thinking he isn’t a virtue ethicist:
As  inverse dialectic applies to a human being’s relation to God, therefore, we 
come close to God only in  worship, and closest of all in bowing down at the 
foot of the altar, where in silent  confession of our sinfulness and nothingness 
before God we seek forgiveness for our  sins and reconciliation with God in 
and through  Christ’s atonement for  sin. A heightening of the God-relation-
ship in Christianity is thus expressed inversely by a lowering of oneself in 
which one goes forward by going backward in the development of a deep-
ening sense of one’s unlikeness to and infinite distance from the divine rath-
er than a direct likeness and closeness to it.20
We might divide the spiritual qualities that Kierkegaard seeks to build up 
in his reader into three groups: 1) the ones that directly express the inverse 
dialectic—qualities like self-control, penitence, humility, and honesty 
about our own shortcomings; 2) ones that presuppose the shortcomings 
of others—forgiveness, forbearance, and compassion; and 3) others that 
incorporate the inverse dialectic without expressing it directly, such as 
faith, love, hope, bold confidence, obedience, and truth. All the Christian 
19See Aristotle, Ethics, book 7, chapter 8.
20Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 130.
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spiritual qualities partake in some way of the inverse dialectic. It is inter-
esting to note that none of the virtues listed here is a virtue in Aristotle’s 
ethics. Walsh doesn’t deny that Kierkegaard seeks to build up good spiri-
tual qualities. She calls them traits of character. But she thinks they aren’t 
virtues because they are permeated by the inverse dialectic. But why not 
just say, with a good portion of the Christian tradition, that the Christian 
virtues are characterized by an inverse dialectic, thus differing in this fun-
damental respect from virtues in other moral traditions? They are good 
qualities of character, so they are virtues.
A person who started out with naïve optimism of success on the project 
of relating absolutely to the absolute and relatively to all relative ends will 
no doubt at certain points in her journey feel farther from her goal than she 
was at the start. But it seems reasonable to me to say that she is closer to 
an actual eternal happiness, even though she feels that she is farther away. 
But if she does take her initial optimism as the standard, she is mistaken 
about what an eternal happiness actually is; and part of the process of edi-
fication is that she outgrows the false conception. The suffering is actually 
progress because it is eroding the striver’s false conception of self and the 
good. Kierkegaard seems to think that it’s part of Christian wisdom to 
realize that Christianity has this inverse dialectic. Knowing this will help 
the striver avoid the twin pitfalls of unrealistic optimism and despair.
Human and Divine Agency in Virtue Acquisition: The Question of Merit
Some people may reason as follows: A virtue is a trait for which the pos-
sessor gets credit. You don’t get credit for being six feet tall, even though 
it’s a good trait to have (it helps you reach high shelves); but you do get 
credit for your honesty, as long as you came by it honestly. If you got it by 
having a neurological operation or by taking a drug, then you didn’t come 
by it honestly, and don’t get credit for it, and it’s not a virtue. Walsh seems 
to have people like this in mind when she says,
Far from suggesting that we can attain the good on our own as claimed in 
classical21 and some contemporary forms of virtue ethics, Kierkegaard em-
phasizes divine agency and a total reliance on the grace of God for the gift of 
spiritual goods, which are perfect in themselves. But constant activity on our 
part as unworthy servants and co-workers of God in giving them expression 
in our daily lives is also required inasmuch as for Kierkegaard “everything 
spiritual is appropriated only in freedom.”22
Christians believe we can do nothing without God’s help, including the ac-
quisition of spiritual qualities, but this is not the same as saying we can do 
nothing at all, or that we can do nothing to acquire spiritual qualities. As 
21Plato and Aristotle didn’t think an individual could acquire the virtues entirely on his or 
her own. Both thought that virtue acquisition required the help of other persons in the form 
of a well-constituted community, though neither thought belonging to such a community 
sufficient for the formation of virtues. That requires individual buy-in. 
22Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 91, citing Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 
60.
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Walsh emphasizes, a virtue ethics that holds that we can become virtuous 
without any help from God is not Christian. But this denial is not to say 
that no virtue ethics at all is Christian. A Christian virtue ethics will stress 
God’s role in our acquisition of the virtues, but it will also allow for the free 
co-operation of the virtues’ acquirer in receiving and exemplifying them. 
Since God’s help in someone’s having a trait doesn’t preclude its being a 
virtue, Christian and theistic virtues can be modes of human agency; that 
is, they are modes of humans doing things, and doing them well. In making 
freedom one of the poles of one of his polarities of selfhood,23 Kierkegaard 
acknowledges and incorporates this basic conceptual point about virtues.
It may thus seem to follow that we acquire in God’s eyes a degree of 
merit for our spiritual qualities proportionate to our agentic contribution 
to their formation and ongoing expression in our lives. Kierkegaard de-
nies this. He imagines two people. One bears in mind for seventy years 
the love of God. He is faithful and single-minded in his desire for eter-
nity. The other goes on year after year without a thought of God’s love. 
Kierkegaard says that these two people are absolutely equally loved by 
God.24 In a Christian virtue ethics our virtues are utterly irrelevant to our 
moral standing before God. In theological terms, we might say that they 
are irrelevant to our justification. This is not to say that they are irrelevant 
to our eternal happiness; after all, they are modes of personal appropriation 
of God’s love, and that is highly relevant to our eternal happiness. God 
loves you just as much as he loves Mother Teresa, but if you don’t love him 
in return you won’t have eternal happiness in God’s love.
Virtues as “Habits”
Aristotle famously describes virtue acquisition as “habituation” (ethiz-
esthai) in good actions, and the standard English translation of Aquinas’s 
works renders the Latin “habitus” with “habit.” These practices have led 
some people to speak of virtues as habits. But the word “habit” pretty 
strongly suggests automaticity of action (or better, of mere behavior), 
and this is a wrong suggestion for virtues, which are paradigmatically 
exemplified in actions performed with intelligent attention, with agency 
fully engaged. Aristotle’s word comes from a word for custom, so that a 
possibly less misleading translation of hexis (the psychological result of 
the process of ethizesthai) might have it that we become virtuous by be-
coming accustomed to performing actions in a certain spirit. We become 
accustomed to thinking and feeling in ways characteristic of the virtues 
and to being personally engaged in what we do. And similarly, “habitus” 
suggests not automaticity, but full agentic engagement in its expressions. 
Walsh points out that a dimension of Kierkegaard’s use of “earnestness” is 
the suggestion of full agentic engagement, and she seems to suggest that 
23See Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 13.
24See Kierkegaard, Without Authority, 165.
335IS KIERKEGAARD A “VIRTUE ETHICIST”?
because Kierkegaard thinks of the spiritual quality of patience as earnest, 
and virtues are habits, he must not think of patience as a virtue:
Patience is seen first of all as the quality that is needed to gain one’s soul, 
which is possessed by every human being eternally but must be gained tem-
porally by giving up the  world for the eternal. To do that, however, one must 
develop and grow in patience through the “quiet but unflagging activity”25 
of repetition in the daily practice of patience not as a habit but in earnestness 
so as not only to gain but also to preserve one’s soul in the ongoing struggle 
with oneself, the eternal, and God, who is patience itself.26
This description of acquiring the spiritual quality of patience is perfectly 
in line with a classical understanding of virtue acquisition. We develop 
virtues and grow in them by repeated unflagging activity in the practice 
of them. The repeated activity leaves behind a dispositional trace on our 
thinking, feeling, and acting that is our readiness to function virtuously; 
but the virtues’ most characteristic expression is in moments when we are 
earnestly living or “existing” in them. This is not to deny that our virtues 
affect and presuppose, in various ways, our auto-pilot behaviors; it is just 
to say that in their most paradigmatic expressions we are fully engaged 
as agents.
The Opposite of Sin Is Not Virtue, but Faith
The following passage in The Sickness unto Death is “perhaps the most im-
portant reason why  Kierkegaard should not be considered to be a virtue 
ethicist”:27
Very often . . . it is overlooked that the opposite of sin is by no means virtue. 
In part, this is a pagan view, which is satisfied with a merely human crite-
rion and simply does not know what sin is, that all sin is before God. No,  
the opposite of sin is faith, as it says in Romans 14:23: “whatever does not 
proceed from faith is sin.” And this is one of the most decisive definitions for 
all Christianity—that the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith.28
This is indeed a difficult passage to interpret on the assumption that 
Kierkegaard is sympathetic to reading the Christian life in virtue terms. 
Let’s approach the passage by examining the crucial terms “virtue,” 
“faith,” and “opposite”:
“Virtue”: Walsh notes that some pro-virtue Kierkegaard interpreters 
read the passage as about pagan virtue, and not about the Christian vir-
tues. After all, faith has been treated as a virtue in large swaths of the 
Christian tradition. One of the theses of this paper is that the Christian 
25Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 169–171, 187, 199; cf. Concept of Anxiety 
149–151, 210.
26Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 90.
27Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 96.
28Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 82. I’m grateful to Mark Murphy and an anonymous 
reviewer for Faith and Philosophy for their dissatisfaction with my interpretation of this pas-
sage in an earlier draft of this paper. 
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virtues are different traits from the pagan ones, even when they go by the 
same name (say, “courage” or “justice”). Faith is absent from all the pagan 
lists that I’m familiar with. Perhaps Anti-Climacus is saying, “the opposite 
of sin is not what the pagans call virtue, but faith.” He does say that the 
view that virtue is the opposite of sin is “in part” a pagan view. Another 
of the theses of this paper is that the Christian virtues are not perfections 
in the absolute sense (that is, excellences than which there is no greater 
of their kind). A person’s having Christian patience, for example, is com-
patible with her patience being less than perfect. So the other “part” of 
the explanation why sin is the opposite of faith rather than virtue might 
be that even Christian virtue doesn’t eliminate sin altogether. This would 
be compatible with Kierkegaard’s work being largely for the purpose of 
upbuilding his reader in the Christian virtues.
“Faith”: But our reading of “virtue” raises the question of what An-
ti-Climacus means by “faith.” The passage that he quotes in support of 
his claim that the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith is Romans 14.23, of 
which the whole verse is, “But those who have doubts are condemned if 
they eat, because they do not act from faith; for whatever does not proceed 
from faith is sin.” Paul is addressing the problem of whether to eat things 
that are prohibited to Jews and has said that all foods are clean, but people 
should consult their consciences about the matter. If you have misgivings 
about eating pork (say), it will be sinful for you to eat it, even though it’s 
not generally sinful; but if you have a firm conviction (“faith,” pistis) that 
it is okay, then it is okay. Thus what does not proceed from faith (that is, 
Christian conviction that it is okay to eat) is sin. “Faith” in the narrow sense 
of Paul’s warning (really just heartfelt conviction that all foods are clean 
in the new order) is pretty obviously not a virtue. But Anti-Climacus, in a 
bold exegetical step, takes the text to mean or imply that “Faith is: that the 
self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God.”29 
Such faith is implicit joyful submission and trust in God (“resting”), a 
willingness to be exactly the self that God created one to be, including an 
unqualified willingness to be “seen” by God (“transparency”). But surely, 
by this definition, faith is a virtue. It is an excellent formation of the human 
self, and that is a perfectly good description of virtue.
Arguably, faith in this sense is a fundamental presupposition of all 
other Christian virtues, for example, of Christian gratitude, humility, 
compassion, forgivingness, hope, patience, and so forth. Unless “the self 
in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God,”30 none 
of these other traits would be Christian virtues. If so, maybe Anti-Climacus 
thinks that faith should not be included among the virtues because it is 
too fundamental: it is not a virtue, but a presupposition of all genuine 
29Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 82; notice that this is the sentence immediately pre-
ceding the passage about virtue that we are discussing
30Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 82.
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virtues. If this is his thinking, it seems to me not to be a very good reason 
for denying that faith is a virtue.
Despair, in any of its many variants, is a bad formation of the self. But 
despair is sin.31 The definition of faith is symmetrical with the definition of 
despair (sin). The formula for despair is: in despair not to will to be one-
self.32 The formula for faith is “that the self in being itself and in willing to 
be itself rests transparently in God.”33 This is why faith is the opposite (the 
absence and good counterpart) of sin. As a counterpart of a bad formation 
of the self, faith would seem to be an excellent formation of the self. And it 
seems to me a reason for finding it odd to imply that faith is not a virtue.
“Opposite”: Let’s say that the opposite of sin is either the absence of 
sin or the good that is the counterpart of sin (as corrupt and evil), or both. 
We’ve noted that, as defined in The Sickness unto Death, both sin and faith 
are qualities or states of a self and are therefore traits (rather than actions 
or discrete events). Perfect faith is, then, the opposite of sin in both pos-
sible senses of “opposite.” So the person with perfect faith no longer has 
the trait of despair/sin. But the person or self is more than his traits, be-
cause he is historical. He has a past, and his past is full of sin, even if he 
currently has faith in the sense of resting transparently in God. Resting 
transparently in God will not remove past sin from his self. So if we take 
the “opposite” of sin to be the absence of sin, then faith in a different sense 
from resting transparently in God will be needed to address it. Past sin 
cannot be removed, but it can be forgiven, and one of the many senses of 
“faith” in Kierkegaard’s writings is belief in the atoning work of Christ.34 
Here no virtue will bring about forgiveness; only Christ’s atonement will 
do it. But faith in this sense is an assurance that past sins are forgiven.
Virtue Ethics and Character Ethics
Walsh denies that Kierkegaard is a virtue ethicist and says it would be 
more accurate to call him a character ethicist.35 She finds herself in need 
of a class-term for what the pro-virtue interpreters of Kierkegaard call 
virtues, and she settles on “spiritual qualities.” But Kierkegaard uses the 
phrase “spiritual qualities” even less than he uses “virtues” (in fact, I think, 
not at all). It seems that he doesn’t have an established general term, used 
in the plural, for the specific virtues or spiritual qualities that he so often 
explores poetically and conceptually. He does, however, have a number of 
global singular terms for personal formation or good formation: “inward-
ness,” “subjectivity,” “earnestness,” “self,” “personality,” and “character.” 
It is also true that increasingly starting around 1846 he speaks of character 
as the goal of ethical and spiritual upbringing and upbuilding.
31Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 77.
32See Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 13.
33Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 82.
34See Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments.
35Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 15, 107, 177.
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Almost all contemporary virtue ethicists would call themselves char-
acter ethicists, thus finding puzzling Walsh’s proposal that Kierkegaard is 
“a character ethicist rather than a virtue ethicist.”36 They would understand 
“character” as a general global term for that of which the virtues and vices 
are the more specific traits, features, or qualities. “Good character” or “vir-
tuous character” would be a summary term for the virtues. So the question 
comes up, what does she think the difference is between virtue ethics and 
character ethics? In a footnote she refers the reader to Joel Kupperman’s 
Character. Let’s look at Kupperman’s argument:
To approach ethics in terms of virtue is . . . a step in the direction of ap-
proaching ethics in terms of character. The first step, virtue ethics, has ad-
vantages but also the disadvantages of a compartmentalized approach to 
moral judgment. It works well in simple and straightforward cases but not 
in ones in which considerations of different kinds conflict.37
Virtue ethics “works well”—for what? What is it supposed to accomplish? 
He thinks of virtue ethics as an “approach to moral judgment.” So it’s 
supposed to yield moral judgments. Judgments about what? Presumably, 
about what to do in a given circumstance, or how to evaluate an action 
already taken (in a circumstance). Kupperman seems to be saying that, 
given an action or opportunity for action, starting from a virtue concept 
(say, courage) with the purpose of figuring out what to do, or figuring out 
whether something already done was the right thing to do, will yield a 
reliable judgment in circumstances where only that virtue concept is rel-
evant—for example, where the only question is, “Does courage require 
this action?” If courage does require this action and courage is the only 
relevant virtue, we can conclude that this action should be taken. But 
Kupperman thinks virtue ethics won’t work so well where more than one 
kind of consideration needs attention. What if the situation forces a choice 
between courageously joining the resistance and compassionately staying 
home with your ailing mother? To obtain a correct judgment in this case it 
won’t do to ask, “Does courage require this action?” or “Does compassion 
require this action?,” because both virtues have appeal in the circumstance. 
One needs to ask, instead, “What does good character (which presumably 
includes both courage and compassion) require?” Two points:
One is that Kierkegaard’s interest in character or qualities of character 
is not that of Kupperman’s “approaching ethics in terms of character.” 
When Kierkegaard thinks about character and its qualities, he isn’t trying 
to come to a judgment about whether an action is right or wrong, or 
offering an account of how we come to such judgments. In contrast, his 
discourses and deliberations highlight character and its traits in the in-
terest of building up character and its traits in himself and his reader. He 
is not engaging in what modern philosophers call “ethical theory,” and 
36Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 15, italics added.
37Kupperman, Character, 112.
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he is decidedly not a “virtue ethicist” in the way that Rosalind Hurst-
house or Michael Slote or Gary Watson is. Kierkegaard’s deployment of 
reflection about character traits is much more like the ancient character 
ethics of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers than 
it is like the kind that arose toward the end of the twentieth century and 
of which Kupperman’s argument for character ethics and against virtue 
ethics seems to be a variant. So the first point is that Kupperman’s “char-
acter ethics” is irrelevant to the interpretation of Kierkegaard. Like the 
classical virtue ethicists, Kierkegaard makes conceptual points about the 
interconnections and purposes of the virtues and normatively defends the 
superiority of a life of virtue over a purely “esthetic” life and to that extent 
is doing “ethical theory.” But all such reflection is subordinate to the larger 
task of personal transformation.
The second point is that Kupperman’s distinction between virtue 
ethics and character ethics is bogus in itself. The doctrine of the “unity” 
of the virtues may be controversial in its details but not as the thesis that 
the virtues come in clusters of mutually supportive traits and that to be 
a person of character is to have an array of virtues that make up one’s 
character, bound together by a vision of what human life is about and 
what is good; and that the person of character is thus equipped with some 
way or ways of deciding what to do in situations that seem to call for 
more than one virtue. (All, or almost all, situations call for more than one 
virtue.) For Aristotle, the virtue that allows for virtuous action in complex 
situations—and indeed, in all situations—is practical wisdom. It’s hard to 
imagine a virtue ethicist, contemporary or ancient, who would employ the 
“compartmentalized approach to moral judgment” that Kupperman de-
scribes. So the second point is that no virtue ethics (in the modern sense) 
functions in the abstract way that Kupperman imagines. His conception of 
virtue ethics is artificial, neglecting the commitment of virtue ethics to the 
interconnectivity of the virtues.
Returning to Walsh,
Kierkegaard’s primary concern is not with becoming a virtuous person 
but with becoming a concrete personality, single individual, and person of 
character through the formation of an authentic self via a relation to God. It 
would therefore be more appropriate to classify him as a character ethicist 
than a virtue ethicist.38
Like Kupperman, Walsh thinks of virtue ethics as fragmentary in con-
trast with character ethics, which she thinks of as holistic, focusing “on 
a sense of self as that which unifies life and gives it meaning.”39 But this 
contrast fails to notice that each of the virtues that Kierkegaard explores 
is a property of the self, and furthermore, each of the virtues, in its own 
way, involves a sense of the self. All the virtues involve self-understanding; 
38Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 107.
39Walsh, Kierkegaard and Religion, 219n187.
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all deep self-understanding involves issues addressed by the virtues; all 
correct self-understanding is virtuous by relation to some virtue or other; 
each virtue contributes to an overall picture of the self, an overall self-un-
derstanding. To love your neighbor as yourself, you have to have a distinct 
understanding of yourself, as Kierkegaard makes clear in Works of Love; 
similarly for God to be the “middle term” between self and neighbor. If 
faith presupposes infinite resignation, as Johannes de Silentio proposes 
in Fear and Trembling, then faith must involve a sense of oneself as de-
tached, in a certain way, from worldly expectations; and if faith involves 
an ongoing personal dependency on its historical object, as Johannes 
Climacus proposes in Philosophical Fragments, it necessarily involves a 
sense of oneself as so dependent. Humility entails a sense of the limitation 
of one’s own powers; contrition is a sense of one’s own moral corruption; 
forgivingness involves a sense of having been forgiven, and forgiveness 
often involves knowledge of oneself as victim; gratitude involves a sense 
of having been given a gift; and so forth, plausibly, for all the virtues. One 
might even argue that the theistic and Christian virtues, in Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of them, are dimensions of the synthesis of the finite 
and infinite, the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, as 
Anti-Climacus defines the self in The Sickness Unto Death. Whether that 
reading can be worked out in detail remains to be seen, but I submit that 
Walsh’s own description of the virtue of patience, quoted above, suggests 
such a reading.
But let’s not despise the fragmentary, either. Johannes Climacus’s rail-
ings against the Hegelian System suggest that for finite human beings 
there’s something to be said for philosophical fragments, for serving 
up one’s edification in bite-sized bits, to prevent choking and promote 
chewing and digesting. Usually, in both his discourses and his pseudon-
ymous works, Kierkegaard doesn’t speak of character in the abstract, but 
focuses on one dimension or another of Christian character—love, faith, 
bold confidence, courage, humility, hope, patience, and so on, and usu-
ally even more specifically within a context. For example, in “To Need 
God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,”40 Kierkegaard arguably 
treats the virtue of humility, but even more specifically in its application 
to self-knowledge. His complaint about the System was existential indi-
gestion. Like reading the System for self-improvement, a character ethics 
that wasn’t a virtue ethics might be like trying to swallow the whole farm 
at once. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is existentially nutritious, in part 
because it is a virtue ethics, and one that serves up the distinct virtues in 
all their rich detail.
Conclusion
It is possible that Kierkegaard avoids or minimizes commendatory use of 
the word “virtue” because of just the associations that Walsh notes: with 
40Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses, 292–326.
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merit, with independence of God, with “habit,” with complete perfection 
in this life, with unhealthy self-preoccupation. I leave open the question 
to what extent these associations are actually justified, even with respect 
to “pagan” virtues. But if we realize that such associations aren’t neces-
sary and insist on attributing only Christianity-compatible properties to 
virtues, and if we think of virtue ethics as an exploratory, reflective, and 
“poetic” strategy for inculcating wisdom, for upbuilding ourselves and 
our interlocutors in Christian character, we have no reason not to associate 
Kierkegaard with “virtue ethics.” The association could help us conceive 
virtue ethics as an enterprise one of whose chief purposes is to make us 
wise and good. Historically, the notion of a virtue is ample enough to 
include the “spiritual qualities” that Christians have sought to form in 
members of the church by the grace of God in response to the person and 
work of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, if Christian philosophers wish to be in 
dialogue with philosophers outside the church, the word “virtue” seems 
to offer a natural bridge between Christian ethics and the character ethics 
of non-religious as well as other religious traditions.41
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